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KLE Society Group, Belgaum, Karnataka


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KLE Society Group, Belgaum, Karnataka
Belgaum (District Belgaum)
Karnataka, India
Pin Code : 590001


KLE Society Group, Belgaum Karnataka is a group of colleges having many colleges in different streams. KLE Society Group, Belgaum Karnataka is managed by Society: Karnatak Lingayat Education Society (KLE Society�s).
KLE Society Group is situated in Belgaum of Karnataka state (Province) in India. This data has been provided by www.punjabcolleges.com. Belgaum comes under Belgaum Tehsil, Belgaum District.

Fax # of KLE Society Group, Belgaum Karnataka is 0831-2455558.

Contact Person(s) of the KLE Society Group, Belgaum Karnataka is (are): Mahantesh Kanthi 9343487323.

email ID(s) is KLE Society Group Belgaum Karnataka

Website of KLE Society Group, Belgaum Karnataka is http://www.klesociety.org.

Chairman : Dr Prabhakar B Kore, Member of Parliament (DOB 01.08.1947: +91-98453-54747.

Contact Details of KLE Society Group, Belgaum Karnataka are : 0831-2495555, 2455557
0831-2473777 (verified no. as on 17.01.2011)

Permanent Address of Chairman:
At Post:Ankali-591293, Tal:Chikodi, Dist:Belgaum
Karnataka State,India
Telephone: +91-8338-254337/254347

Residence:
Ajmer House
BC 92, Church Road,
Camp,Belgaum-590009.
Karnataka.India.
Mob:98453-54747.
Telephone: +91-831-2465577,2404477
Fax:+91-831-2452757

Chairman
KLE Society, Belgaum-590001.
Karnataka,India.
Telephone :+91-831-2404040
Fax:+91-831-2404060
Mr Kagwad, General Manager


Other colleges of KLE Society Group, Belgaum
GI Bagewadi Arts, Science and Commerce College, Nipani
KLE Societys College of Engineering and Technology, Belgaum
KLE Societys Lingaraj College Belagavi, Belagavi
Primary Teachers Training Institute (D Ed), Belgaum
KLE Societys Womens Arts and Commerce College, Gadag
BV Bhoomraddi College Of Engineering and Technology, Hubli
KLE Societys College of Education, Hubli
KLE Societys Jagadguru Gangadhar College of Commerce, Hubli
KLE Societys PC Jabin Science College, Hubli
S Nijalingappa College Rajajinagar, Bangalore
KLE Societys Law College, Bengaluru (Bangalore)
S A Manvi Law College, Gadag
KLE Societys BV Bellad Law College, Belgaum
KLE Societys Law College, Chikodi
KLE Societys Institute of Dental Sciences, Belgaum
KLE Societys Dental College, Bengaluru (Bangalore)
KLE Societys Institute of Nursing Sciences, Belgaum
KLE College of Education (B.Ed.), Ankola
KLE Societys COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, Athani
KLE Societys COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, Belgaum
KLE Societys COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, Nipani
KLE Societys COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, Bengaluru (Bangalore)
KLE Societys College of Pharmacy, Ankola
KLE Societys College of Pharmacy, Gadag
KLE Pharmacy College, Nipani
KLE College of Pharmacy, Bangalore
KLE Societys College of Pharmacy, Belgaum
KLE Societys College of Pharmacy, Hubli
KLE Societys College of Pharmacy, Udyambag
KLE Societys Institute of Nursing Sciences, Ankola
KLE Societys SHRI SM SS BCA COLLEGE, Athani
KLE Universitys Jawaharlal Nehru Medical College, Belgaum
KLE Societys College of Naturopathy and Yogic Sciences, Belgaum
RL Law College, Belgaum
KLE Societys RL SCIENCE INSTITUTE, Belgaum
BK College of Arts Science and Commerce, Chikodi
KLE Societys Basavaprabhu Kore BBA College, Chikodi
Mrityunjaya College of Arts and Commerce, Dharwad
KLE Societys JT COLLEGE OF ARTS, SCIENCE and COMMERCE COLLEGE, Gadag
KLE Societys JT COLLEGE OF BBA, Gadag
KLE Societys JG BCA COLLEGE, Haveri
KLE Societys GH COLLEGE, Haveri
KLE Societys BBA COLLEGE, Hubli
GK Law College, Hubli
KLE Societys SK ARTS AND HSK SCIENCE INSTITUTE, Hubli
KLE Societys GI BAGEVADI BCA COLLEGE, Nippani
KLE Societys SVB ARTS and COMMERCE COLLEGE, Savadatti
KLE Societys Gh BCA College, Haveri


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Professor, Asstt Professor and Associate Professor (KLE Society Group)
Job Vacancy: 13th February, 2013
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KLE society dvara 216 shekshanik sansthan sanchalit (News)

Prof, Asstt Prof, Associate Professor (Job Vacancy)

Director, Prof, Asstt Prof, Associate Professor etc (Job Vacancy)

BTech in various streams (Admission Notice)

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Good Placement Facility etc (Profile)

Professor, Asstt Professor and Associate Professor (Job Vacancy)


Media coverage of KLE Society Group, Belgaum Karnataka, Karnataka

Karnataka MLC shot at by cousin over property dispute

Belgaum, Oct 19 (UNI) Congress legislative council member Prabhakar Kore, was shot at by his cousin Jagdish Kore at Ankali village in this district over a property dispute this afternoon.

The seriously injured Prabhakar Kore, who was shot at with a revolver thrice in the back, was immediately rushed to KLE Hospital here. KLE hospital sources said his condition was stable, but critical.

Two bullets were removed from his body during an hour-long operation. Mr Kore, also the chairman of the prestigious Karnataka Lingayat Education (KLE) Society, had an altercation with his cousin Jagadish over a land dispute and in a fit of rage, the latter shot him from behind.

Mr Kore had gone to his native village Ankali to see a hi-tech operation theatre built by the KLE society at the village.

Both had a verbal altercation and Mr Kore neglected his cousin s threat to kill him. Jagdish immediately fired four shots at the former. While three bullets hit him - two in his rib cage and one in his hip, the fourth one missed him.

Mr Kore was instrumental in the Karnataka Government holding a special session of the State Legislature in Belgaum last month by providing the premises of his society s medical college to host the House proceedings.

Police sources said Jagdish was absconding after the incident.

Court Case K.L.E. Society And Anr. vs Rajiv Gandhi University Of Health Sciences And Ors

Decided on 11/11/2002

ORDER

N. Kumar, J.

1. The first petitioner is a premier educational society in the State of
Karnataka which is running the second petitioner-college. The second petitioner-
college was started in the year 1990 imparting B.Sc. Nursing course. The
petitioners approached the Karnatak University seeking permission to start M.Sc.
in Medical Surgical Nursing and Community Health Nursing with an intake capacity
of 4 seats in each discipline. The Karnatak University recommended to the
Government for granting permission to start the aforesaid courses by its letter
dated 30-5-1996. However, from 1-6-1996 the Rajiv Gandhi University of Health
Sciences Act, 1994 came into force establishing the first respondent-University.
The Government granted permission to the petitioner to start the aforesaid
courses by its order dated 9th March, 1998. However, the permission was confined
to only two seats in the aforesaid courses from the academic year 1998-99. The
first respondent-University accorded continuation of affiliation to the college
on 1-9-1998. The second respondent-college requested the Government to accord
permission for additional seats on 22-5-1999.

2. The case of the petitioners is, in pursuance of the aforesaid request,
experts of respondents 2 and 4 inspected the college on 18-7-1999 and 29-7-1999
and they have recommended for the enhancement of seats from 2 to 4 in each of
the post-graduate specialities. However, the second respondent was not in a
position to act on the said recommendation immediately in view of the elections
to the Assembly and Lok Sabha in September 1999. Therefore, a formal order
increasing the intake capacity was deferred. It is further case of the
petitioners that when they approached the Government after the election they
were given to understand that it is open to them to make admissions as per the
proposed intake capacity of 4 students and that the issuance of Government order
is only a matter of time. On such assurance the petitioners filled up the two
additional seats. Thereafter, they forwarded the names of four students each in
two disciplines to the University for approval on 11-3-2000 in the prescribed
form. The first respondent-University declined to approve the admission of the
four candidates, namely, respondents 5 to 8, to these writ petitions and the
second respondent-college was directed to discharge those students immediately
as their admission is in excess of the approved intake. The said letter is dated
15-4-2000. However, after the aforesaid letter of the University the Government
by its order dated 20-5-2000 increased the capacity for the academic year
2000-2001. Thereafter, the Government by letter dated 28-6-2000 directed the
first respondent-University to approve the admissions of the aforesaid students
by adjusting them against the intake capacity of the current academic year
2000-2001 as the college has voluntarily undertaken to forego and surrender four
seats in 2000-2001 so that the aforesaid four students admitted for the academic
year 1999-2000 could be adjusted against the seats for the current academic
year. The said letter is dated 28-6-2000. Thereafter, the second respondent-
college brought to the notice of the University the increase in the intake as
per the orders of the Government and their undertaking to surrender four seats
for the academic year 2000-2001 and therefore the students admitted for
1999-2000 would be adjusted against the said vacancy and their admissions be
approved by their letter dated 29th June, 2000. In spite of the said request as
the first respondent-University did not approve the admissions of respondents 5
to 8 they were constrained to approach this Court for quashing of Annexure-F,
the letter dated 15-4-2000 issued by the University to the college directing
them to discharge the respondents 5 to 8 from the college and for a direction to
the first respondent-University to approve the admissions of respondents 5 to 8.

3. This Court while entertaining the writ petition on 28-9-2000 passed an
interim order permitting the respondents 5 to 8 to take the examination held in
September 2000. By further order on 5-9-2001, respondents 5 to 8 were permitted
to take the examination in second year M.Sc. Nursing course. Thus, the students
have completed the course, taken the examination and as there was an order not
to announce the results, the results have not been announced.

4. The Government issued a corrigendum on 26-4-2001 to its earlier order
dated 20-5-2000 to the effect that the academic year 2000-2001 mentioned in the
Government Order, dated 20-5-2000 is to be read as 1999-2000. The effect of the
said corrigendum is that the second respondent-college was permitted the intake
of two extra seats in each discipline from the academic year 1999-2000 itself.

5. The first respondent-University has filed its counter. It is submitted
that the Indian Nursing council has fixed the intake of the petitioner-college
in M.Sc. Nursing Course for the academic year 1999-2000 as four. A certificate
dated 1-7-1999 issued by Indian Nursing Council to the second respondent-college
fixing the intake as four seats for the academic year 1999-2000 is produced. The
University has granted continuation of affiliation to conduct M.Sc. Nursing
course for the academic year 1999-2000 by notification dated 7-9-1999 keeping in
view of the permission granted by the Indian Nursing Council in the aforesaid
letter. It was submitted that since the apex body as also the University have
fixed the intake of the petitioner-institution to the said course for the
academic year 1999-2000 at four, the college is not justified in admitting
respondents 5 to 8 who are in excess of the admission capacity of the college.
The University was justified in refusing to approve the admission of respondents
5 to 8. The Government cannot direct the University to approve the admission
made by the college in excess of the admission capacity of the college fixed by
the Competent Authorities. Therefore, they submit that these writ petitions lack
merits and are liable to be dismissed.

6. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the Competent
Authority to fix the intake for admission to the aforesaid courses is the
Government and when once the Government has sanctioned the intake of four
students in each discipline, it is not open to the first respondent-University
to refuse to approve the admissions on the ground that the Indian Nursing
Council has fixed the intake at four seats, and therefore submits, the order of
the first respondent-University directing the second petitioner-college to
discharge respondents 5 to 8 is liable to be quashed and a direction to be
issued to the University to approve the admission of respondents 5 to 8.

7. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent-University
submits, though the Government has fixed the intake at four students in each
discipline, according to them, the Government has no power to fix the intake and
it is the Indian Nursing Council which is competent to fix the intake and as
they have fixed the intake at only two students in each discipline they are
bound by the said intake fixed by Indian Nursing Council, the fourth respondent
herein, as such the admissions of respondents 5 to 8 cannot be approved.

8. Learned Counsel appearing for the fourth respondent-Indian Nursing Council
submits, the fourth respondent is the authority to fix the intake in any college
which comes under its jurisdiction and as the Council found that the
infrastructure available in the second petitioner-college do not warrant for any
additional intake, they have fixed at only two seats in each discipline and
therefore any admission made in excess of what is prescribed by the fourth
respondent is illegal and cannot be approved and the University is justified in
refusing to approve the admissions of respondents 5 to 8 which are made in
excess of the approved intake.

9. From the aforesaid facts and rival contentions, the short point that
arises for my consideration in these writ petitions is as under.-

Who is the Competent Authority to fix the intake for M.Sc. in Medical
Surgical Nursing and Community Health Nursing

10. The second petitioner-college was started with the permission of the
Government in the year 1996. It was affiliated to the Karnatak University. The
second petitioner made an application to the Karnatak University for permission
to start M.Sc. in Medical Surgical Nursing and M.Sc. in Community Health Nursing
with an intake capacity of four seats in each discipline. On receipt of the said
application, the Karnatak University by a communication dated 30th May, 1996
addressed a letter to the Government stating that the Committee constituted by
the Syndicate of the University visited the college on 2-4-1996 and has
recommended for grant of permission to start the aforesaid courses. However, the
Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as
the "Act") was passed to establish and incorporate a University in the State of
Karnataka to be known as the Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences, for the
purpose of ensuring proper and systematic instruction, teaching, training and
research in modern medicine and Indian Systems of Medicine in the State of
Karnataka. Section 5 of the Act deals with jurisdiction and admission to
privileges. Sub-section (1) of Section 5 states that no college in the State of
Karnataka imparting education in Health Sciences shall save with the consent of
the University and the sanction of the Government, be associated in any way with
or seek admission to any privileges of any other University in India or abroad.
Sub-section (3) of Section 5 makes it clear that with effect on and from the
date of commencement of this Act all colleges and autonomous institutions of
Health Sciences previously admitted to the privileges of or affiliated to the
Universities of Mysore, Bangalore, Kar-natak, Mangalore, Gulbarga and Kuvempu
shall be deemed to be admitted to the privileges or affiliated to the
University. By virtue of the aforesaid provision as the second petitioner-
college was affiliated to Karnatak University prior to the amendment of the Act,
the second petitioner-college shall be deemed to be admitted to the privileges
or affiliated to the Rajiv Gandhi University and it is entitled to all the
privileges enjoyed by the college prior to the commencement of the Act. The said
Act came into force from 1-6-1996. After the Act came into force, the Government
of Karnataka by its order dated 9th March, 1998 as per Annexure-B granted
permission to start the M.Sc. in Medical Surgical Nursing and M.Sc. in OP and D
Nursing with an intake of two seats in each discipline from the academic year
1998-99 as against the request of the petitioner to fix the intake at four seats
in each discipline. Acting on the aforesaid Government Order the first
respondent-University by its order dated 1-9-1998 as per Annexure-C continued
the affiliation to the second petitioner-college with an intake capacity of two
seats in each of the disciplines subject to the conditions stipulated to the
said order. Subsequently, as per Annexure-R1, dated 7-9-1999, the affiliation
was continued by the University for the academic year 1999-2000 subject to the
conditions mentioned therein.

11. The Indian Nursing Council, fourth respondent herein, also issued what is
styled as suitability certificate as per Annexures-R2 and R3 for four seats in
M.Sc. Nursing courses in pursuance of the provisions of Sub-section (2) of
Section 13 of the Indian Nursing Council Act of 1947. Thereafter, they
approached the Government for increase of the intake from two seats to four
seats in each discipline as per Annexure-D, dated 22-5-1999. In the meanwhile,
the second petitioner-college admitted four students for the academic year
1999-2000 for the aforesaid two disciplines. The second petitioner-college
addressed a letter to the first

respondent-University on 11-3-2000 as per Annexure-E enclosing along with the
same the name of eight students admitted for the academic year 1999-2000 and
requesting the University to approve those admissions. It is in answer to this,
the first respondent-University as per Annexure-F informed the second
petitioner-college that the four candidates, namely, respondents 5 to 8 should
be discharged immediately as their admissions are in excess of the sanctioned
intake. After the aforesaid letter, the Government by order dated 20-5-2000
increased the intake from two seats to four seats in each discipline as
requested by the petitioner. However, the said Government Order made it clear
that it would come into effect from the academic year 2000-2001. Subsequently, a
corrigendum was issued on 26-4-2001 correcting the academic year as 1999-2000
instead of 2000-2001. In spite of the Government sanctioning the intake at four
students in each discipline, the University declined to approve the admissions
of respondents 5 to 8 on the ground that the Government is not the authority to
fix the intake and according to them it is the Indian Nursing Council which is
the Competent Authority to fix the intake.

12. Section 45 of the Act deals with affiliation of colleges. Sub- section
(10) of Section 45 which deals with admission of students to the college and to
a course and also the intake reads as under.-

"(10)(a) No admission of student shall he made by any new college seeking
affiliation to the University or by an existing college seeking affiliation to a
new course of study to such course, unless, as the case may be, affiliation has
been granted to such new college or to the existing college in respect of such
course of study.

(b) The maximum number of students to be admitted to a course of study
shall not exceed the intake fixed by the University or the Government, as the
case may be and any admission made in excess of the intake shall be invalid".

13. A reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear, the intake for any
course of study is to be fixed by the University or the Government as the case
may be and any admission made in excess of the intake shall be invalid. It is
not in dispute that the University has not fixed the intake of any course. The
intake for a Nursing course is fixed by the Government. Now, admittedly in the
instant case Government has fixed the intake for the academic year 1999-2000 as
four for each discipline. If that is so, the admission of respondents 5 to 8 for
the academic year 1999-2000 would be well-within the intake prescribed by the
Government. Therefore, it cannot be said that their admissions cannot be
approved as they are admitted in excess of the approved intake.

14. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents contend, the Indian Nursing
Council Act of 1947 being a Central legislation it would have an overriding
effect on the Act which is a State legislation and therefore if the power to fix
the intake rests with the Indian Nursing Council the Government has no power to
fix the intake for any course. In that view of the matter any order of the
Government fixing the intake for any of the Nursing courses has to be ignored
and they have to give effect to the intake fixed by the fourth respondent-
Council.

15. In order to appreciate the said contention, it is necessary to have a
look at the provisions of the Indian Nursing Council Act of 1947 (hereinafter
referred to "INC Act") to find out whether the said Act empowers the Council to
fix the intake of any of the Nursing courses.

16. The INC Act was passed to constitute an Indian Nursing Council in order
to establish a uniform standard of training for nurses, midwives and health
visitors and for other matters. Section 2 of the INC Act deals with definitions,
Section 3 deals with constitution and composition of the Council, Section 4
incorporation of the Council, Section 5 with mode of elections, Section 6 deals
with term of office and casual vacancies, Section 7 deals with meetings, Section
8 deals with officers, committees and servants of the Council, Section 9 deals
with the Executive Committee and Section 10 deals with recognition of
qualifications. It deals with what are the recognised qualifications and
recognised higher qualifications and they are set out in Parts I and II of the
Schedule and it also provides only when the Council recognise the qualification
or grants the authority it would be recognised as qualifications for the purpose
of the said Act. Section 11 deals with effect of recognition and it provides,
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law any recognised qualification
shall be a sufficient qualification for enrolment in any State register and no
person shall after commencement of this Act be entitled to be enrolled in any
State register as a nurse, midwife, auxiliary nurse-midwife, health visitor or
public health nurse unless he or she holds a recognised qualification. Section
12 deals with power to require information as to courses of study and training
and examination. Section 13 deals with the power of the Executive Committee to
appoint Inspectors for inspection of the institutions and other incidental
matters. Section 14 deals with withdrawal of recognition by the Executive
Committee when the education imparted by any institution is not in conformity
with the regulations made under the INC Act or fall short of the standards
required thereby or that an institution recognised by a State Council for the
training of nurses, midwives, auxiliary nurse-mid-wives or health visitors does
not satisfy the requirements of the Council. Section 16 deals with power to make
regulations. In particular Section 16(g) deals with prescribing the standard
curricula for the training of nurses, midwives and health visitors, for training
courses for teachers, of nurses, midwives and health visitors and for training
in nursing administration. Section 16(h) provides for prescribing the conditions
for admission to courses of training as aforesaid and Section 16(i) provides for
prescribing the standards of examination and other requirements to be satisfied
to secure for qualifications, recognition under this Act. Therefore, in the
entire scheme of the INC Act there is no provision specifically empowering the
Council to prescribe the intake in any particular course.

17. In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 16 of
the INC Act the Council has made the regulations which are called as Indian
Nursing Council Regulations. Part I of the said regulation deals with time and
place of, and preparation of business for meetings of the Council, Part II deals
with conduct of business at meetings of the Council, Part III deals with minutes
of the Council, Part IV deals with election of members of the Council, Part V
deals with resignation and filling of casual vacancies, Part VI deals with
tenure of office and powers and duties of the President and Vice-President, Part
VII deals with constitution of the Executive Committees, Part VIII deals with
constitution of Committees, Part IX deals with tenure of office and powers and
duties of Secretary and other officers and servants of the Council and Part X
deals with inspection of examination and training institutions. Regulation 63
which is relied on by the learned Counsel for the fourth respondent to point out
that though specifically there is no provision empowering the Council to fix the
intake a reading of this Regulation 63 impliedly confers power on the Council to
fix the intake. A reading of the aforesaid regulation makes it very clear, it
only deals with the inspection of examinations under Section 13(1) of the INC
Act and it does not deal with any fixation of intake by the Council and
therefore it is not-possible to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for
the respondents that the aforesaid regulation by implication confers power on
the Council to fix the intake.

18. Learned Counsel for the fourth respondent also relied on the Indian
Nursing Council Master of Nursing Syllabus and Regulations (Post-graduate
Nursing Education) dealing with general requirements which provides as under.-

I. The number of admission to Master course in Nursing in each speciality
shall not be more than two per post-graduate teacher per year.

II. .....

III. ......

IV. In exceptional cases, in a speciality with one post-graduate teacher
and another teacher with post-graduate qualification a maximum of four students
can be admitted per year".

On the basis of the aforesaid regulations, he contended that having regard to
the post-graduate teachers available in the second petitioner-college they
cannot admit more than two students per discipline, and therefore contends, in
view of the aforesaid provisions it is the Council which is the ultimate
authority to fix the intake of the students of any particular course. In support
of his contention he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Medical Council of India v. State of Karnataka, .

19. Apart from the aforesaid Act, regulations and guidelines nothing is
placed on record to substantiate their contentions that it is the Council which
is the ultimate authority to decide the intake in respect of all Nursing
courses. If the INC Act and its regulations had categorically provided that the
Council shall fix the intake of any particular course and if the law passed by
the State legislation was in conflict with the aforesaid provision then the
question of repugnancy would arise and in that context the law passed by the
Parliament would have an overriding effect on the law passed by the State
legislation.

20. In the case of Medical Council of India, supra, prior to the amendment to
the Indian Medical Council Act, 1966, it is the State Government which was
fixing the intake. After amendment to the MCI Act by introducing Sections 10-A,
10-B and 10-C it is made clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the
said Act or any other law for the time being in force a bare reading of Section
10-A(1)(b)(ii) as also Section 10-B(3) clearly shows that no medical college
shall increase its admission capacity in any course of study and training except
with the previous permission of the Central Government obtained in accordance
with the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 8 or Section 10-A. In that
context it was held in the said judgment that no medical college could admit any
student in excess of its admission capacity fixed by the Medical Council subject
to any increase thereof as approved by the Central Government and that Sections
10-A, 10-B and 10-C will prevail over Section 53(10) of the State Universities
Act and Section 4(b) of the State Capitation Fee Act. However, in the instant
case admittedly there is no provision in the INC Act providing for fixation of
intake of students for any course by the Council. No corresponding amendments as
contained in Sections 10-A, 10-B and 10-C of the MCI Act has been introduced
into the INC Act. By virtue of Entry 25 of List III i.e., the concurrent list
the State Legislature is competent to legislate regarding education, including
technical education, medical education and Universities, subject to the
provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I Vocational and Technical
Training of Labour. In the absence of the Parliament not making any provision
regarding fixation of intake of students under the INC Act, the law passed by
the State Legislature fixing the intake of students for admission to the Nursing
course would be valid and legal and has to be given effect to. The result would
be in the absence of any specific provision in the INC Act in view of Sub-clause
(b) of Sub-section (1.0) of Section 45, the Government has the power to fix the
intake. Therefore, the Competent Authority to fix the intake for M.Sc. in
Medical Surgical Nursing and Community Health Nursing is the Government and the
Nursing Council under the INC Act has no power to fix the intake of students for
the aforesaid courses.

21. In the instant case, when the Central legislation do not provide for
fixing of the intake by the Council, the State has full power to provide for the
intake in view of Sub-section (10)(b) of Section 45 of the Act. In exercise of
the said power when the State Government fixes the intake it is not open to the
first respondent-University, to ignore the intake fixed by the Government and to
take note of the letters written by the fourth respondent to the University
fixing the intake of the second petitioner-college. When the fourth respondent
has no power to fix the intake even if they had written a letter to the
University informing that the intake fixed by them for the second petitioner-
college is only two per discipline it has no value in the eye of law and the
same has to be ignored by the University. The Government Order fixing the intake
at four per discipline is to be given effect to. In that view of the matter, the
approach of the University is illegal and cannot be countenanced.

22. In fact, the second petitioner-college has shown their bona fides by not
admitting the four students in each discipline for the academic year 2000-2001
and they have restricted their admission for the academic year only for two
students per discipline and they have surrendered two seats and have requested
the Government to adjust the same towards the admissions made for the academic
year 1999-2000. This conduct of the college is fair and just and the University
was in total error in not acceding to the request made by the second petitioner-
college to approve the admissions of respondents 5 to 8. Under these
circumstances, I pass the following order:

The impugned order passed by the first respondent bearing No. RGUHS/AC2-ADM
M.Sc. (NV2000-2001/02, dated 15-4-2000 as per Annexure-F is hereby quashed.

A direction is issued to the first respondent to approve the admissions of
respondents 5 to 8, namely, Sri Rajesh M.S. and Sri Mejula J. Rajamani in
Medical Surgical Nursing and Ms. Meenakshi B. Devangmath and Sri Vinod A.
Hukkeri in Community Health Nursing.

A further direction is issued to announce the results of both the I and II
year M.Sc. and if the respondents 5 to 8 have passed in the said examination to
give them all consequential benefits such as issue of marks card, certificates
etc.

Court Case K.L.E Society and Ors Vs. Siddalingesh

Title
K.L.E Society and Ors Vs. Siddalingesh

Coram
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, AFTAB ALAM

Act
Industrial Disputes Act

Subject
Code of criminal Procedure, 1973:

s. 482 - Complaint for offences under IPC - Initiation of criminal proceedings - Application for quashing the proceedings and complaint -Dismissed by High Court - On appeal held: Complaint was an abuse of process of law - In the facts of the case, accusations in the complaint are not made out - Proceedings quashed - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 403, 405 and 415 r/w s. 34.

s. 482 - Inherent powers under - Nature and scope of - Held: Exercise of such power in cases of quashing of proceedings is the exception and not the rule- It is, though wide, has to be exercised sparingly in order to do substantial justice - It should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution- While exercising such powers courts not to function as court of appeal or revision.

Respondent was appointed as a peon with the appellant-society. He filed a petition in terms of s. 33 (C) (2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 stating that lesser amounts were paid to him and his signatures were taken for higher amounts. After his retirement he filed a complaint against the society and its Principal and Secretary alleging commission of offence punishable u/ss. 403, 405 and 415 r/w s. 34 IPC. He stated in the complaint that he was given to understand by the appellants that certain amounts were being deducted for repayment at the time of retirement. Judicial Magistrate took cognizance and issued process. Appellants filed application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the proceedings and the complaint. High Court dismissed the application. Hence the present appeal.

Citation
2008 AIR 1702, 2008(3 )SCR783 , 2008(4 )SCC541 , 2008(3 )SCALE490 , 2008(3 )JT410

Head Notes
Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The complaint was nothing but an abuse of the process of law. High Court came to the conclusion that deductions were made without any rhyme and reason and without any basis. That was not the case of the complainant. On the other hand, it tried to make out a case that the deduction was made with an object. That obviously, was the foundation to substantiate claim of entrustment. On a close reading of the complaint it is clear that the ingredients of Sections 403, 405 and 415 do not exist. The statement made in the complaint runs contrary to the averments made in the petition in terms of Section 33-(C) (2). [Paras 7 and 12] [795-C, D; 790-A, B]

2.1 Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., in a case of the nature where quashing of criminal proceeding is sought, is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Cr.P.C. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. [Para 8] [790-C, D]

2.2 It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). [Para 8] [790-D, E, F, G]

2.3 While exercising powers under the Section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. [Para 8] [790-G; 791-A, B, C, D]

2.4 When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it, accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. [Para 10] [792-A, B, C]

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) 335 - relied on.

2.5 Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [Para 11] [793-G; 794-A, B]

Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary 1992 (4) SCC 305; Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1 - relied on.

2.6 It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. [Para 11] [794-B, C, D, E, F, G; 795-A]

Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar 1990 Supp SCC 686; State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma AIR 1996 SC 309; Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill 1995 (6) SCC 194; State of Kerala v. O. C. Kuttan AIR 1999 SC 1044; State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma 1996 (7) SCC 705; Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada 1997 (2) SCC 397; Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi AIR 1996 SC 2983; Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi 1999 (3) SCC 259; State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and Anr. 2002 (3) SCC 89; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Anr. 2005 (1) SCC 122; R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 - relied on.

Basava Prabhu S. Patil, V.N. Raghupathy, B. Subrahmanya Prasad and Narayan P. Kengasur for the Appellants.

Kiran Suri for the Respondent.

Judgment Made On 03/03/2008
CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 427 of 2008

JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 427 OF 2008
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.63 of 2007)

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court dismissing the application filed before it in terms of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short Cr.P.C. ). Prayer in the application before the High Court was for quashing the proceedings in C.C.No.273/2006 including the complaint on the file of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gulbarga.

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as under:


Respondent was appointed as a Peon in K.L.E. Society s Women Arts and Commerce College in the year 1992 of which the appellant no.3 was the Principal at the relevant point of time. Appellant no.2 was the Secretary at the relevant point of time and the Society was represented by its Chairman, Board of Management. He resigned from service on 17.12.2003. The complaint was filed on 13.1.2006 alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 403, 405 and 415 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short IPC ). The learned Judicial Magistrate took cognizance and issued process. The same was questioned by the appellants. The stand before the High Court was that the complaint was misconceived, no offence was made out even on indepth scrutiny of the complaint. In fact, the respondent had filed petition in terms of Section 33 (C) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short ID Act) and also filed writ petition claiming parity in salary which was disposed of by giving the direction to consider the respondents case. In the
petition in terms of Section 33-(C)(2) of the ID Act the respondent had stated that lesser amounts were paid and signatures for higher amounts were taken. The said petition is pending. In the writ petition before the High Court there was no mention about any deduction. It is stated in the complaint that the complainant was given to understand that certain amounts were being deducted for repayment at the time of retirement or cessation of his job. In the notice issued on
23.11.2004, there is no mention about this aspect. It was, therefore, submitted that the complaint was nothing but an abuse of process of law.

4. The complainant-respondent resisted the stand by stating that the offences are clearly spelt out.

5. The High Court dismissed the petition holding as follows:

The respondent lodged a private complaint against the petitioner on 13.1.2006 along with six supporting documents. After perusing the complaint, the documents and the sworn statement of the respondent, process is issued against the petitioners for the aforesaid offences. This petition is filed for quashing the proceedings.

6. Learned counsel for the appellants reiterated the stand taken before the High Court. On the other hand, respondent also reiterated the stand taken before the High Court.

7. One thing is clear on reading of High Court s reasoning that the High Court came to the conclusion that deductions were made without any rhyme and reason and without any basis. That was not the case of the complainant. On the other hand, it tried to make out a case that the deduction was made with an object. That obviously, was the foundation to substantiate claim of entrustment. On a close reading of the complaint it is clear that the ingredients of Sections 403, 405
and 415 do not exist. The statement made in the complaint runs contrary to the averments made in the petition in terms of Section 33-(C) (2).

8. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It
only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the
High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right
and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law
gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

9. In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866) this Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings.
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance
e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the
evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

10. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not
support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is
reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of
oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration
before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an
instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) 335). A note of caution
was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an
order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act
concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.
Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The
High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the
evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305), and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar
(AIR 1964 SC 1). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would
be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the
complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of
the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance.

It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. (See: Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar (1990 Supp SCC 686), State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma (AIR 1996 SC 309), Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995 (6) SCC 194), State of Kerala v. O. C. Kuttan (AIR 1999
SC 1044), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma (1996 (7) SCC 705), Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997 (2) SCC 397), Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (AIR 1996 SC
2983) and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi (1999 (3) SCC 259, State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and Another (2002 (3) SCC 89) and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Anr. (2005 (1) SCC 122).

12. When the factual scenario is examined in the background of the legal principles set out above, the inevitable conclusion is that the complaint was nothing but an abuse of the process of law. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the proceedings in C.C.No.273/2006 pending before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gulbarga.

13. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits so far as the petition under Section 33-(C)(2) of the ID Act is concerned, which is stated to be pending.

Court Case : Kle Society S College Of Pharmacy vs State Of Karnataka And Ors. on 16/2/1996

ORDER
M.F. Saldanha, J.

1. Heard petitioner s learned Advocate and learned Government Advocate.

2. This is a case in which the petitioner s learned Advocate has raised a very strong grievance with regard to the state of affairs that was in existence around 31.7.1995. The petitioner is a well established institution and we are concerned with the admission to the B. Pharma course conducted by the petitioners. They were eligible to admit 90 students for the current academic year. But, having regard to the fact that this is a course for which there is not all that much of demand, only 71 applications were received by the petitioner s institution. What had happened was, that the Government in keeping with the rules framed by them for the purpose of centralising the admissions had issued the necessary notices in the press in relation to the common entrance test, which is as early as on 11.5.1995. The petitioner has produced the copy of this prominent announcement in the press at Annexure-A to the petition. They have clearly indicated the courses in respect of which the Common Entrance Test Cell would conduct the admissions and have excluded the B.Pharma course. There is no dispute with regard to this aspect of the matter. Petitioner s learned Advocate states that, in this back-ground, the irresistible conclusion was that since the number of students who normally opt for this Course are limited and there is no real need to have to evaluate from among the students that the Government had decided not to include this course as far as the GET Cell procedures were concerned. He states that, right upto the end of July which is two and half months after the issuance of the notification no announcement was issued that any such test were being conducted for the B-Pharm course and therefore, in normal course the petitioner has scrutinised the applications received by them and admitted as many as 71 students which is well below the permissible intake. The learned Advocate has also produced before me the curriculum that has been published by the Karnataka University which indicates that the term as far as this Court is concerned commenced from 31.7.1995 and that the colleges are required to send the names of the students within ten days from the date. He therefore submits that, this action on the part of the petitioner was absolutely bonafide and in good faith and cannot be found fault with.

3. Surprisingly, on 1.8.1995 the petitioners received a telegram from the Director of Medical Education instructing them not to admit the students and when the petitioners responded by pointing out that they have already admitted the students, they were informed by another telegram that these admissions would not be approved of. It was under these circumstances that the petitioners had to move this Court for obtaining appropriate orders. By virtue of the interim orders passed by this Court, the 71 students have continued with the course in question. The petitioner s learned Advocate submits that, in this back-ground this Court ought to direct the respondents No. 2 and 3 to regularise the admissions of the 71 students in question.

4. The learned Government Advocate has raised a preliminary objection with regard to payment of separate court fee contending that, even though the institution has filed -a single petition which can be maintainable that the beneficiaries are separate and therefore separate court fees have to be paid. Petitioner s learned Advocate has vehemently objected because, he points out that in this case even if not in others, the cause of action is singular. He seeks to state that it was the action of the petitioner institution that has been found fault with and it is therefore the institution which has challenged the decision of the Director and that therefore, the question of treating this as being a representative petition on behalf of the students is not justified. In answer to this, the learned Government Advocate has once again reiterated the submission that the ultimate beneficiaries are the students, that it is not the institution which is the aggrieved party if the admissions are cancelled and that they have to pay the individual court fees and therefore, merely because the cause of action has been amalgamated and represented by the institution, that the complexion of the matter cannot be altered. This Court has consistently taken the view that the ultimate test to be applied is as to who are the aggrieved parties But more importantly as to who would be the ultimate beneficiary of the orders or directions which the Court issues. In keeping with the answer to these questions in all these cases, even if the students are represented by the institution and a single petition is maintained separate court fees have been directed to be paid. Consequently, petitioners shall tender the deficit Court fees to the office of this Court within four weeks from today, whereupon this petition which is treated as a single Writ Petition shall be renumbered and treated as a group of 71 petitions. The office shall follow the procedure of numbering it as W.P.N0.30921-A/95 followed by AA, AB, AC, etc.

5. As regards the main issue, the submissions that have been put forward by the petitioner s learned Advocate are faultless and will necessarily have to be upheld. Regarding promulgation of the rules whereby the Government has reserved to itself the power of centralisation and conducting the requisite scrutiny, as it is necessary that the Government indicates its decision in respect of the courses in question within the prescribed time particularly for the notice of the institutions and the students concerned. If this is not done, then the petitioner s contention that the Government had probably decided not to include this particular course, within that procedure, is the only justifiable and irresistable conclusion. Under these circumstances, the petitioners cannot be faulted for having admitted the students in question particularly since the term was to commence from 31.7.95. Learned Advocate is also right when he points out that the petitioners have not admitted a single student for the course after 31.7.95 and further more, that they have not exceeded the permissible intake. Under these circumstances, the respondent No. 2 was not justified in having communicated the decision that the admissions would not be approved of.

6. Learned Government Advocate has submitted that if for any reason the B. Pharm had not been included in the advertisement that the petitioners could not have taken advantage of it. He submits that, once the rules have been framed, that the institution was fully aware of the fact that the only authority to scrutinise and finalise the admission process was the CET Cell and that if for any reason this has not been indicated in the advertisement, then the petitioners ought to have referred the matter for clarification to the Department. I see no obligation of that type that can be cast on the petitioners because prerogative of conducting test which is prescribed in the rules is something that has to be exercised by the Government Department and if it is not done, then the petitioners would be justified in assuming that they do not propose to exercise those rights. More importantly, there is a very valid reason, as far as the present course is concerned which the petitioners learned Advocate has point out, namely, that the admissions made were much less than the available capacity and that therefore, there was really no need for any complicated scrutiny process have to be made or taken up for admissions to this Course and in view of that, the objections canvassed on behalf of the parties cannot be upheld.

7. In the aforesaid situation, petitioners are entitled to succeed. Petition is accordingly allowed. The respondents are directed in special facts and circumstances of this case to regularise the admissions of the 71 students provided they are otherwise found to be eligible and for this purpose, the petitioners shall submit to the second respondent a list indicating the various qualifications and other requisite particulars in relation to these 71 students. Unless there is some serious breach such as one of requisite qualification etc., the second respondent shall not refuse to regularise the admissions on any other frivolous or untenable grounds. The learned Government advocate points out that, there are well defined rules which prescribe the eligibility criteria and respondent No. 2 shall act in accordance thereof.

8. Before parting with this petition, it would be necessary to convey to the respondents-State Government one recommendation. This Court has repeatedly found that the magnitude and volume of labour that is involved in the conduct of the CET Test which in state like Karnataka involved the centralised scrutiny, interviews, allocation etc., of virtually lakhs of students is so enormous that the Department concerned who are not really equipped for this purpose and have to undertake the jobs, are now virtually struggling and in the process, that the entire time-frame goes out of control and further more, that the admissions cannot be completed within the prescribed time. Under these circumstances, on a careful consideration of the matter, the Court recommends that these functions should be invested with the University. These bodies are fully equipped with the machinery for dealing with thousands of students, scrutinising cases in academic matters, conducting admissions etc., and therefore, if necessary the State Government should apply to the appropriate Court for modification of the directions in order to ensure that the academic bodies undertake this function. It is hoped that the State Government will act on these directions so that the difficulties that have been cropping up and worsening over the last few years will be completely taken care of before the next academic year. The present case is another classic instance where the error if any has occurred obviously because of gross over-loading of the Department and various Government facilities and therefore it is high time that some alternative measure be provided for. The learned Government Advocate to convey these recommendations to the State Government. The petitions accordingly succeed and stand disposed of with these directions.

No order as to cost.


Summary: KLE Society Group, Belgaum Karnataka website, mobile, contact address and approval / recognition details.